Will Climate Change Complicate African Famine?

The African Sahel, that region immediately south of the Sahara, has been gripped by recurring droughts for the past twenty years. Too often, famine has followed on the heels of drought, and world headlines have chronicled the human suffering that resulted. In recent years, this attention has sparked large-scale mobilization of relief by the European and North American communities and also a growing apprehension of the potential for such disasters in the future.

During 1988, news from the Sahel was distressing. Rains came and harvests were generally good, but famine persisted within and nearby the region, most notably in the Sudan. Equally troubling for the longer term, debate among climate researchers continued over likely changes resulting from global greenhouse warming. Though the specifics of these changes remain unclear, there is one point of general agreement: the earth will be getting warmer and Africa will be affected.

Problems of the recent past in the Sahel, combined with the uncertainty raised by the potential of climate change, raise three fundamental questions: What is the relationship between drought and famine? How might changes in global climate affect the Sahel region? What can be done to prevent future famines that could accompany global climate change?

African drought

A hallmark of semiarid regions in general, including the Sahel, is the great variability in precipitation both within and between years. Thus, neither the failure of Sahelian rains in 1984 nor their late arrival in 1987 are uncommon events. Either circumstance contributes to drought and ultimately to decreases in crop yields.

Because the climate is semiarid, the seemingly unusual recent run of dry years in the Sahel is not without precedent (see figure 1). Comparable drought sequences likely occurred in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and again in the 1820s and 1830s. Two factors, however, set the recent series of droughts apart from those of the past. First, the run of wet years in the 1950s encouraged the extension of agriculture into increasingly marginal areas, creating a situation from which problems would most certainly arise when drought again prevailed. Second, the granting of political independence to many Sahelian countries in 1960—and the consequent disruption of economic and political continuity—coincided with a pronounced decline in precipitation and the onset of the recent series of droughts.

Does drought mean famine?

Particularly today, it is easy to find drought with no famine, and conversely, famine without drought. The past year brought examples of both. In the United States, thanks to a broad, well-subsidized agricultural base, diverse climatic resources, and a strong highly integrated economy, a significant drought beset the heart of the major agricultural region, yet did not result in famine, food shortages, or even highly inflated food prices. In stark contrast, parts of Sudan experienced no drought, but were subject to severe famine. Both sides in the ongoing Sudanese civil war used famine as a weapon by denying farmers access to their fields and intercepting food assistance—a situation that is unfortunately common.

As a result of such experiences, it has become clear that the relationship between drought and famine is more complex than generally believed. Conditions that lead to famine are created by any one or a combination of economic, social, or political factors. Political instability, weak or poorly integrated economies, and social (that is, ethnic) friction can combine to make systems of food production and distribution highly vulnerable to disruption. The vulnerability created by internal conditions may make it difficult or impossible for indigenous institutions to deal decisively with external shocks such as drought.

Drought alone is usually incapable of creating famine. However, it can, and often does, play an important role in hurrying the famine process along. Ultimately, therefore, drought must be given particular attention to better determine and deal with its root causes.

Climate change scenarios

Regional implications of a change in global climate are extremely conjectural. A number of global circulation models have been under development at research institutions for some time, but results indicated by the models show little agreement. In fact, the magnitude and spatial distribution of the changes they portray for temperature and precipitation across the African continent are fundamentally different. However, there is concurrence on two points for the Sahel: temperatures are likely to remain constant or increase, and precipitation is likely to remain constant or decrease. In short, the best case suggests a continuation of current semi arid conditions, and the worst case points toward increasing aridity. Under either scenario, periodic drought will remain a feature of the Sahelian landscape.

Preventive measures

The dramatic famine relief efforts mounted by western powers during the 1970s and 1980s have come to dominate much of popular thought regarding the Sahelian condition. Although there is no question that these efforts are warranted when emergencies arise, they should be seen for what they are: short-term remedies for the symptoms of larger ills.

Solutions to famine in the Sahel are no different than they have been in other countries. They revolve around the development of a vital agricultural sector within the national economy. China and India are notable examples of countries that, within the past two generations, have moved from the list of those countries classed earlier as "famine prone" to those that are approaching "famine resistant." This evolution has been achieved in both cases through sustained programs of agricultural development.

Ironically, agricultural development has been a priority for the Sahel since independence. It has been the focus of vast quantities of aid from a host of international donor agencies.

Over time, a number of assistance programs that rely on the basics of agricultural development have been implemented. These basics have been broadly defined as the four "I's" by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and include: (1) incentives to grow more than what is needed to subsist; (2) inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, and credit; (3) institutions that provide indigenous support for agricultural development; and (4) infrastructure for production, distribution, and marketing. Despite these efforts, however, the Sahel has not succeeded in following the examples of China and India.

Yield risk or price risk

In the past, most agricultural development plans for arid or semiarid areas generally did not consider drought as a recurring feature of the climate. Average precipitation values were taken as the norm, and plans were assembled accordingly. This thinking still is common, even in countries such as the United States where semiarid lands have seemingly been successfully developed. As a result of this failure to recognize constraints imposed by climate in semiarid areas, the objectives employed by donor agencies in the Sahel appear to follow the same lines used in other climatic zones. Generally, agricultural research and development in more humid climates seek to maximize profit through increasing yields while reducing inputs. This is eminently sensible in those places where yield risk—the risk of losing a crop—is smaller than price risk, the risk of a poor market at harvest.

In developing countries, especially those that are arid or semiarid, the objectives may be quite different. Yield risk assumes considerable importance in agriculture geared toward subsistence. Thus, the primary objective of traditional agricultural systems has been to minimize risk— yield risk—often at the expense of yields or profit, by dividing land, labor, and capital resources among several different and independent activities. This clearly represents a fundamentally different strategy. It is translated into agricultural diversity, or an approach in which "several eggs are put in many baskets." However, as traditional agricultural systems have incorporated larger and larger cash cropping components, they have become increasingly subject to price risk as well. Thus, agricultural systems that have both subsistence and market components are exposed to significant elements of both price risk and yield risk.

That part of the Senegal River valley shared by the West African countries of Senegal and Mauritania offers examples of the strategies that are used to deal with price risk and yield risk. The Senegal River, which rises in the Guinea highlands to the south, floods during the dry season (late fall). As the floodwaters recede, local farmers plant sorghum in the low-lying lands flanking the river. During the summer rainy season, millet is planted in the lighter upland soils. In this way, local farmers meet a large part of their subsistence needs and minimize yield risk by exploiting all the agricultural opportunities presented to them throughout the year.

Other yield-risk minimization tactics are also pursued, some of which seem almost nonsensical in other environments. For example, farm families commonly work several widely separated fields in the two major production areas (lowlands and uplands). This fragmentation spreads their risk and improves their chances of having one or more fields that produce a crop during the year. They also grow different complementary crops within the same field (by intercropping sorghum and cowpeas, for example) and encourage selected native plants in areas adjacent to their fields that supplement the food supply, particularly in times of drought. Beyond agricultural pursuits, many members of farm families regularly seek off-farm employment to provide yet another source of income.

Irrigation has been been employed in virtually every arid or semiarid climate in the world, both to improve yields and to insulate farmers from yield risk. Not surprisingly, small and large irrigation development projects have been initiated along the Senegal River, including a major dam at Manantali for controlling the flow of the river and producing electric power. The rationale was that, by regulating the flow of the river, three high-value rice crops could be grown for market during the year, and farmers' reliance on riskier recession and rain-fed cropping systems would be reduced or eliminated.

Irrigation development has, so far, had mixed results. Rice production in the region—and hence income—has risen considerably as the irrigated area has expanded. However, recent development has been carried out by businesses rather than local farmers—businesses whose primary interest is in crops that meet market demands rather than local subsistence needs. These new irrigated plots have been developed on lands near the river that in the past were incorporated in traditional local patterns of field rotation. Moreover, farmers who previously worked the land are often excluded from the irrigation development. Thus, in some places, irrigation has destabilized existing subsistence agricultural systems.

Even subsistence-oriented farmers who have had access to irrigated land have not behaved as planned. Rather than putting all their eggs in one basket and concentrating solely on irrigation, they have incorporated irrigation as a new element in their traditional yield-risk minimization strategy. Such farmers have grown only one irrigated crop a year and continued their recession and dryland farming as dictated by the season. This approach has proved to be prudent because, aside from its benefits, irrigation has also brought another set of risks. Spare parts and fuel are not always available for irrigation pumps, often making it impossible to produce any crop in irrigated fields.

The mixed success of irrigation, combined with the poor local market for electric power and delays in the construction of a generating plant, have brought about evolutionary changes in the development strategy of the Senegal River valley. For the foreseeable future, the Manantali dam will be managed to yield an optimal flood for recession sorghum, probably at the expense of power production. Meanwhile, current agricultural research along the valley mirrors this change in development orientation with programs that address problems associated with the major crops (sorghum, rice, and millet) produced by each cropping system (recession, irrigation, and dryland farming) and which are consistent with traditional strategies of yield-risk minimization through diversification.

Representative of the Sahel at-large, the situation in the Senegal River valley suggests how to address the conditions that lead to current famine and to famine that might accompany global climate change.

Solutions to famine in semiarid regions are built on sound agricultural development—but development that recognizes and accommodates the risks associated with drought. It can be and has been argued by researchers in developing countries that their ability to deal with drought is probably the key to meeting the challenges of global climate change.

The agricultural strategies that have evolved in arid and semiarid lands, such as the Senegal River valley, rely on a "diversified portfolio" that minimizes the yield risk that accompanies drought. Ultimately, irrigation will be part of the answer. But if the Senegal River is representative, irrigation will not come quickly or soon, and it is likely to be only part of the answer. A program to develop and support diverse cropping systems that are consistent with traditional practices is both appropriate and efficient in meeting the very real risks of today while preparing for those that will undoubtedly accompany global climate change.

These objectives, however, will be extremely difficult to meet. First, an emphasis on diversity also requires a division of human and capital resources that are scarce to begin with. Local governments have found it difficult, if not impossible, to manage and support a sustained program of research and development in diversified cropping. Second, in addition to the economic burden, agricultural development presents its own set of risks—most of them relating to economic and political hazards. Urban populations in the Sahel have grown alarmingly as a result of the disruption of agricultural production due to drought. Thus the incentives to farmers—good prices—that are required to further development also threaten political stability in most countries, since they must be reflected in higher food prices in the cities. The balance that must be struck between the competing needs of urban and rural populations will be difficult to define and much harder to achieve. In the end, these economic and political issues will likely contribute more to the threat of future famine in the Sahel than will global climate change.