The "Limited World" View

Support for "expansion" as the self-evident end of policy was never unanimous, but it became increasingly fragmented after the mid-1960s. The "realities" on which it was based began to appear shaky. Technological improvement came more slowly than anticipated, happiness did not track the GNP, and the efforts against poverty—both domestic and foreign—did not make it vanish. Further, the real cost of energy (especially the heightened estimates of the environmental amenities lost in its acquisition and use) began to rise instead of fall. Conditions and revised values had made a naive "growth" viewpoint vulnerable even before the 1973-74 jump in the cost of energy made it infeasible.

A view of the world fundamentally different from the expansion vision gained impetus from disillusionment with the growth prescription but it exhibits positive attributes as well. Essentially, it suggests that the natural world is "limited" so long as man seeks satisfactions in exploiting and dominating it, but that continuity and indeed happiness can co-exist with a restructuring of human behavior into "natural" flows.

Again, three tenets underlie this position:

1. Resource constraints make it impossible to sustain the current rate of energy supply growth.
2. Attempts to continue on this path will disrupt human values and lead to unacceptable risks.
3. Ever-growing energy use by an affluent minority represents a fair diversion of world resources to a few, so that a limitation of energy demands is required in the interests of the broad community--including future generations.

Several factors contributed to the formulation of these tenets. Resource constraints were newly found to be binding. They led to pessimism about potential energy supply from exhaustible resources and "hard" technologies, as well as about the ability of existing political and economic systems to meet the changed energy supply and use patterns required for the future. Congestion lowered amenities, and made many persons aware of the disutilities associated with population growth—even population growth outpaced by output of goods. The ability of the natural environment to absorb additional residues from production and consumption was being strained, and a growing portion of gross output was being used up in seeking to offset the environmental deterioration created by production and consumption activities. Indeed, the belief grew that "more" often meant "less" when full costs were accounted for. Finally, extrapolation of the physical requirements of U.S. lifestyles (either into the future or over most of mankind) seemed to indicate that the goals of the expansionist perception were literally not feasible.

Changing perceptions of the large and small physical risks associated with energy (explored in chapters 12 through 14) have added support to the "limited world" rejection of economic growth. First, there has been an accretion of knowledge that indicates that some biological systems are more fragile than once thought, and that activities once commonplace and accepted may indeed prove harmful. Second, and of more concern to people, the interrelations of biological, political, and social systems have become closer and more visible. Further, as material goods have increased in availability, the importance of nonmarket amenities has come to be ranked higher than before. There is less willingness to gamble such amenities against the additional capacity to produce traditional goods and services. The overall result is that fewer risks are acceptable than formerly in acquiring and using energy. This shift is revealed in hostility toward technological change, and specifically in suspicion of nuclear power and in willingness to forgo its possible benefits.

Enhanced concern for communal values is the final tenet of the move away from the expansionist vision. It takes many forms—including a broadened definition of community to include nonhuman values, and a changing perception of the requirements for equity, which has come to cover the whole of mankind and to stretch across generations.

An identifying element here is the treatment accorded "nature." Both the expansionist and the limited world viewpoints have a place for the protection of nature, but each starts from a very different premise. The expansionist approach is man-centered: natural amenities are defined by the value accorded to them by people who are alive at this moment—including their preference for leaving something of value to those who come later. These goals are achieved through rules adopted by members of society to guide each others' conduct. The limited world value system includes the desire to preserve or enhance "nature" for itself, and this is an entirely different matter. For example, wilderness areas have been set aside on the ground that it is important to preserve such areas—not necessarily as a means of achieving specific goals for human beings, but for the sake of wilderness itself. The view here is that "man" is part of nature, not the lord over it, and in preservation lies a duty beyond enlightened self-interest. "Wild rivers" are to be preserved intact, not harnessed, even at the sacrifice of man's own narrow "best interests," however they might be projected or discounted. While the defense of endangered species is often justified on the basis of unspecified unknown future benefits for mankind, there seems to be beneath that man-centered rhetoric a fundamental belief that other species deserve to be protected from man—just for themselves.

Another factor in the enlarged view of community is a revision in the concept of the tradeoff among generations. In the "limited" view of possibilities for the future, the conclusion is that the future might be better served if we consumed less now. This contrasts with the expansionist view that prospects for the future are enhanced if we bequeath future generations a larger stock of goods and a larger productive capacity.

The implications of this difference are striking. The expansionist view may present areas of intergenerational rivalry, but within a general scheme of intergenerational harmony. In the other case, however, the conflict is unrelieved; additional production and consumption today carries a presumption that it will make future generations worse off. This "limited world" perception is of a "storehouse" world, which—when emptied—will no longer support life. The expansionist alternative sees a "factory" world, in which the use of a barrel of oil now can help to find new sources of energy for the future.

Another difference in values has to do with concerns about interpersonal, interregional, and international equity. Society and its instruments have long signaled that the distribution of income and wealth is of more than individual interest, but the criteria for social intervention and its goals depend heavily on one's starting point. In the case of an optimistic view of unlimited opportunities for expansion, the focus tends to be on equality of opportunity, so the accepted starting point is that returns to individuals should be based on contributions to output. In the other view, goods should be distributed among members of society as a matter of right; production—or lack of it—is a less powerful source of legitimizing variations from the average level of well-being.

Tied to the increased importance placed on collective values is the contention that (in the interests of equity) the community should have some influence over which "wants" people "should" be able to satisfy. Productive capacity is perceived to be limited, and output belongs to the broader community as a whole. Thus the behavior of any individual (or nation) who takes more than his share of goods "out" (notwithstanding how many he or it puts "in") is seen as unfair.

To put this in energy-related terms: When desire for a fairly even distribution of benefits is combined with a pessimistic view of prospects for additional energy supply, an energy-intensive lifestyle appears antisocial. Reducing energy consumption becomes a goal in itself.

The thesis that the world's resources are limited leads to acceptance of a different set of energy policy options than those which would appeal to the expansionist viewpoint. Because prospects for enhancing energy supply are seen as poor, and because of the high overall costs and risks that the quest for such increases is thought to bring, the emphasis is placed on reducing energy wants. This view includes the perception that the existing energy-economic system is not in long-run equilibrium, particularly because of dependence on nonrenewable and depleting resources (including the environment). Thus, it assumes that the existing decision system predicated on the primacy of individual wants—will not lead to timely adjustments. It seeks a change in institutions in order to move the system off its self-destructive path.