The IAEA at Thirty

Last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) celebrated its thirtieth anniversary. How should we evaluate its three decades of international public service? What should we expect in the fourth decade? These are entirely appropriate questions in their own right. But they take on added significance at a time when concerned nations are scrutinizing international organizations generally, assessing how effectively these institutions, created to facilitate international cooperation, are functioning.

In reflecting on the past, two sectors of IAEA activity stand out as meriting special attention—nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety. This does not, of course, detract from the role that the agency has played more generally in "accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world," as mandated by its statute.

Indeed, the IAEA has been prominent in facilitating the transfer of experience, information, and technology to a large number of states. More than 11,000 fellows from all regions of the world have received training through agency-sponsored fellowships in nuclear and basic sciences. More than 10,000 expert assignments have been carried out, their purpose being to provide member states with expertise for the application of nuclear techniques across a broad spectrum of fields including food and agriculture, medicine, hydrology, and industry in general.

In addition, IAEA has dispensed nearly $150 million worth of equipment to advance the introduction of nuclear applications and to facilitate hands-on experience in training and application. The agency has also provided in excess of $28 million in the form of research contracts with particular emphasis on sponsoring integrated research programs involving institutes in both developing and industrial nations. It would not be too much to say that the organization of science in a number of developing nations has benefited directly from activities of the IAEA. Even so brief a reference to some of the agency's assistance and development programs underscores its role as a key multilateral organization for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Nuclear safeguards

This consideration notwithstanding, if one were to single out the IAEA's most distinctive international contribution, pride of place would have to be given to the safeguards system that it operates. Not only have safeguards made possible the extensive international cooperation and trade in nuclear materials and equipment that have characterized the last three decades, but as a critical element of the nonproliferation regime, international safeguards have contributed significantly to national security and international stability.

This is not a matter of cursory judgment. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which designated the IAEA as the instrument for verifying non-nuclear-weapon-state obligations under the treaty, asserted in the Final Document of the Third NPT Review Conference (1985) that "IAEA safeguards provide assurance that states are complying with their undertakings and assist states in demonstrating this compliance. They therefore promote further confidence among states and help to strengthen their collective security. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . . ."

Despite frequent reference to safeguards, they are not well understood by the public. The very word "safeguards" is misleading, for it evokes the "cop-on-the-corner" image in which executive authority and the ability to take preventive measures inhere. Domestic nuclear safeguards, carried out under the authority of the state, include physical security measures, pursuit, and restitution. International safeguards, however, do not. Rather, they are in the nature of an auditing system in which records and reports submitted by those subject to the safeguards are examined and reviewed and in which direct physical verification of inventories is independently conducted by international civil servants carrying out on-site inspections.

These on-site inspections, which are the truly unique feature of IAEA safeguards, include a variety of destructive and nondestructive measurement techniques and the application of containment and surveillance measures, all of which help to ascertain the presence, movement, quality, quantity, and characteristics of the nuclear materials under safeguards. Safeguards constitute, in other words, verification of a state of affairs which confirm, or not, the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by parties to safeguards agreements concluded with the IAEA.

In conducting its verification activities, the IAEA is not authorized to attempt to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials or to seek out and uncover the existence of clandestine nuclear materials or facilities. In planning its inspection activities, however, the agency does make certain assumptions that take these possibilities into account.

But if this kind of approach helps the agency refine its goals and strategies for verification, it does not give it the power to conduct intelligence-gathering activities beyond those required to verify that material under safeguards can be adequately accounted for. What the agency can do is report its inability to account adequately for all material under safeguards, thereby alerting the appropriate authorities—i.e., the IAEA Board of Governors and the international community at large—that assurances cannot be provided and that the possibility of diversion and nuclear proliferation exists. This power to expose, based on the conduct of effective and comprehensive safeguards, is one of the most important preventive assets of the IAEA.

The ability of the IAEA to be effective and to sustain credibility depends on a number of factors, three of which are especially significant: (1) comprehensiveness of coverage, (2) cooperation of states under safeguards, and (3) adequacy of resources. Of course it goes without saying that even though safeguards may contribute to developing and maintaining a climate of confidence, their effectiveness is dependent on the political atmosphere in which they function. A weak or deteriorating political-security situation (for example, in the Middle East) inevitably minimizes reliance on safeguards and diminishes their opportunity to contribute to international stability.

Ninety-five percent of all nuclear activity in non-nuclear-weapon states is under safeguards today. As impressive as this figure is, even more striking is the 5 percent not under safeguards. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa account for that 5 percent. These six principal non-nuclear-weapon-state holdouts from participation in the NPT or Tlatelolco regimes (the latter treaty established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America) are the subject of worldwide concern. For one reason or another, they have failed to bind themselves in multilateral instruments to abjure nuclear weapons or explosives and to accept comprehensive international safeguards.

While even comprehensive safeguards do not guarantee absolute assurance, the existence of unsafeguarded nuclear activities in such states creates uncertainty and places distinct limitations on the ability of an international institution like the IAEA to provide the requisite degree of verification. Thus, comprehensive safeguards in all non-nuclear-weapon states would be an important step in strengthening the overall effectiveness and credibility of verification safeguards. To say this is not in any way to ignore the broader issue of achieving universal nuclear disarmament and global verification.

State cooperation, another key factor in safeguards effectiveness and credibility, entails many complex considerations. At the risk of oversimplification, suffice it to say that verification is not direct control. The ability of a verifying institution to carry out its responsibilities efficiently and effectively depends on a well-structured and well-operated national accounting and control system that produces the necessary records and reports on a timely basis; it involves cooperative nuclear plant operators who help facilitate inspector access to carry out safeguards tasks; and it requires national legislative and executive measures to ensure that the application of safeguards techniques and measures and the carrying out of safeguards procedures are not impeded.

Despite a considerable degree of cooperation on the part of most states, problems do exist. In some instances, operators refuse to carry out certain requests of the inspectorate. Or, they may prevent the introduction of new instrumentation or procedures—either on the ground that the changes were not specifically provided for in the subsidiary arrangements of the safeguards agreement or because they do not want to risk, and the agency cannot assume, liability if damage occurs as a result of a proposed activity.

In other cases, some states impose restrictions on the particular agency-designated inspectors to whom they will permit access to their territory and facilities. This long-standing problem has affected the rational allocation of IAEA manpower resources and placed limits on the ability of the safeguards department to maximize efficiency—an especially serious matter in a period of financial stringency.

These problems of cooperation are perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that safeguards are a novel enterprise and do involve a degree of intrusion on national privacy. They are not overwhelming, but they are important enough to require attention and redress in the name of effective international verification.

Adequacy of resources is a third significant area. For several years, international organizations including the IAEA have labored under the constraint of zero-growth budget. At the same time, the agency's safeguards responsibilities have increased as new facilities have come on line and the amounts of nuclear material subject to safeguards have grown. In the past two years, for example, the number of installations in non-nuclear-weapon states under safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material has increased by twenty-five. Despite the slowdown in the growth of nuclear power, that pattern will continue for some time. Furthermore, member states exhort the agency to continue to improve the level of attainment of inspection goals, which is itself in no small measure resource-dependent.

Meeting new obligations and improving safeguards performance are incompatible with a no-growth budget. Improved efficiency can help ameliorate this problem. But beyond that, continued credibility of safeguards activities will depend on additional resources—be they taken from other agency programs or provided through increased funding. Drawing resources away from other programs of principal interest to substantial segments of agency membership entails political problems concerning program priorities, equity, and balance of objectives. This option is not feasible. The only plausible alternative is increasing resources, which would be fully compatible with the contribution that safeguards provide to international security and stability.

The role of the IAEA in nuclear safety achieved public prominence in the wake of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Soviet Union in April 1986. The recent emphasis on the need for international safety measures obscures the fact that nuclear safety always has been on the IAEA agenda as a matter of primary concern. Agency safety-related activities have paralleled the pattern of nuclear development in member states. During IAEA' s first decade, emphasis was placed on the development of safety standards, guides, and codes of practice in the safe handling of radioactive sources, in radiation protection, and in transportation of radioactive materials.

In the agency's second decade, when nuclear power became more widespread, the focus shifted to the protection of the general public and the environment. A program to develop an internationally accepted frame of reference for safety, including codes of practice and safety guides for nuclear power plants, was initiated in 1974. In the course of eleven years, five codes covering governmental organization, siting, design, operation, and quality assurance, and fifty-five supporting safety guides, were prepared. While these are guidelines, not mandatory rules of the road, they are applied to all agency-assisted projects and have been incorporated in the national legislation of many countries.

The accident at the U.S. Three Mile Island (TMI) plant in 1979 led to a review and further expansion of the IAEA safety program. The Division of Safety and Environmental Protection was supplanted by a separate Division of Nuclear Safety, and a number of new activities were created. These included operational safety review teams (OSARTs), which carry out in-depth reviews of operational practices and procedures at nuclear power plants and make recommendations for improvement; radiation protection advisory teams (RAPATs), which assess radiation protection needs and provide advice on strategies for strengthening them—a service of particular value to developing nuclear nations; and the incident reporting system (IRS), which receives and disseminates information on safety-significant events occurring at nuclear facilities in participating states, thereby helping to identify and correct problems that could cause accidents.

The international developments that followed TMI were, of course, well known in the nuclear community. But they were known only slightly, if at all, by the public at large. It was the Chernobyl accident that galvanized international public concern about the safety of nuclear energy, for unlike TMI, Chernobyl involved a spectacular accident with significant quantities of radioactive debris being released (none was released at TMI) and disseminated over a wide area involving many countries; furthermore, as a result of this accident, some people died and others received substantial radiation exposure (neither of which occurred at TMI). Chernobyl underscored the irrelevance of national boundaries in nuclear accidents and, consequently, the potential vulnerability of anyone to a nuclear accident anywhere.

After Chernobyl, the focal point for international action once again was the IAEA. The agency was seen as the forum to which the international nuclear community could turn in its effort to deal with the global implications of nuclear energy.

Exceptional progress was made in that forum. Two conventions were negotiated. One relates to early notification when there has been an uncontrolled release of radioactive material from any source that might result in transboundary effects of potential radiological significance. The other convention establishes an international framework for emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. Conventions covering these matters were urged following TMI but lacked the necessary support among agency members. By contrast, it took only four weeks to negotiate both conventions after Chernobyl, and both went into effect shortly after being opened for signature.

Also following the Chernobyl accident, the IAEA's nuclear safety program was expanded, with emphasis on measures to help minimize the consequences of accidents and, more importantly, on preventive measures. In the latter regard, increased attention is being given to the incident reporting system and to a new, related program (ASSET) designed to analyze abnormal safety-related events in depth—not only the causes of the event but also the appropriateness of the corrective measures taken.

Significantly increased use is being made of the OSART service, not only by newer entrants into the field of nuclear a power but by the most advanced nuclear states as well, including the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United States. The knowledge that human error was a critical element at both TMI and Chernobyl has focused agency attention on the question of the interface between man and machine.

Perhaps the most striking event during this period, however, was the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide detailed information about the Chernobyl accident at a post-accident review hosted by the IAEA and attended by more than 500 experts from around the world. The comprehensiveness and candor of Soviet participation in this exercise are, more than a year later, a point of frequent comment in the nuclear community. It is difficult to envision such an exchange in any other arena, which again reflects the degree of confidence that the IAEA has earned among its members. It is for this reason that safety is singled out, along with safeguards, as meriting special attention in an assessment of the IAEA' s first thirty years.

In the decade to come it may be anticipated that the IAEA will continue to play a critical role in the field of nuclear safety. Mandatory international safety inspection along the lines of nuclear safeguards inspection is implausible, and the agency's nuclear safety standards are unlikely to achieve mandatory status. The responsibility for nuclear safety at this level lies first and foremost in the hands of national governments, which have the authority and the power to impose and enforce safety rules.

The IAEA, however, through its programs and its presence as a forum for dealing with nuclear safety issues, can affect what is viewed as an appropriate standard and what kinds of operational norms and measures are needed to ensure safe nuclear power. By focusing attention on issues of nuclear safety, identifying the areas most in need of attention, coordinating national nuclear safety efforts, servicing agreements such as those related to early notification and emergency assistance, and providing a framework and a forum within which states can, in confidence, harmonize safety measures and procedures, the IAEA acts as the linchpin of nuclear safety around the world. The degree to which it achieves success in these activities may bear substantially on the public acceptance—and the future—of nuclear power. With respect to both safety and safeguards, IAEA' s record of achievement is an enviable one. Indeed, if the organization did not exist, it would have to be invented.