The Global Warming Issue: Viewpoints of Different Countries

The sudden rise of global warming to prominence on the international political agenda is remarkable. In 1986 the global warming issue was of interest mostly to the scientific community, some environmentalists, and a handful of politicians. By the summer of 1988 the issue was nearing the forefront of international scientific and political discourse. In the United States and western Europe the public was being bombarded through the popular media (both print and television) with stories on global warming. Front-cover stories in Time and Newsweek underscored the potential for catastrophic consequences unless action was taken to control global warming. Elements of the international scientific, political, and environmental communities organized conferences and released statements expressing the need for governments to take action. World leaders such as former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany have taken a personal interest in the global warming issue. It became important in the 1988 U.S. presidential election and has been on the agenda of recent economic summits of the major industrial democracies.

In an effort to forge an international scientific consensus on the potential magnitude and impacts of global warming and what (if anything) to do about it, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The recommendations by the IPCC, released at the second World Climate Conference (a meeting of 137 countries held in Geneva, Switzerland, in November 1990), included a call for international action to reduce emissions of gases that contribute to global warming (so-called greenhouse gases). In February 1991, representatives from over 100 countries met in Chantilly, Virginia, for the first of a series of meetings aimed at negotiating an international agreement on global warming.

The United States is the principal member of the group advocating a cautious approach (although other countries support part of the U.S. position). It maintains that not enough scientific evidence is available to justify potentially costly measures to mitigate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Nevertheless, it endorses preliminary actions such as establishing an international convention to devise a framework for dealing with global warming. It also supports the funding of research and the pursuit of what the Bush administration terms "no-regrets" climate change strategies. These are strategies, such as measures to conserve energy, that would produce important environmental benefits in addition to helping control global warming.

To a large extent, the U.S. position hinges on the belief that curtailing emissions of CO2 would impose a substantial burden on the U.S. economy without providing significant corresponding benefits. This position is supported by the Council of Economic Advisers, which maintains that the stabilization of or reduction in CO2 emissions is likely to be extremely expensive and could be more costly to the United States than to its major competitors. The U.S. perception of the magnitude and relative burden of costs to limit CO2 emissions puts into perspective its policy to pursue no-regrets measures. Yet, to date, the United States has not explicitly pursued no-regrets climate change policies, but rather has identified existing policies (such as the U.S. obligation to phase out chlorofluorocarbons under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) that also limit greenhouse gas emissions. The United States has been accused by nongovernmental organizations and some West European governments of using its emphasis on more research and no-regrets policies as a substitute for real measures to reduce CO2 emissions. Yet the United States government believes that near-term action to stabilize or reduce CO2 emissions is not yet warranted and is not in its best interest.

Internationally, the United States has been a major participant at climate change meetings, including those of the IPCC. However, it has generally found itself supporting a minority position on the content of many conference declarations. At the Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change held in Noordwijk, The Netherlands, in November 1989, the United States resisted efforts by many western European countries to specify targets and timetables for stabilizing and reducing CO2 emissions. It rejected similar language at another international meeting held in Bergen, Norway, in May 1990, and at the second World Climate Conference. Rather than endorse specific CO2 emissions targets, the United States supports the trading among countries of emissions reductions for multiple greenhouse gases—not just carbon dioxide—believing such an approach will provide greater flexibility.

At one time, the United States found support for its position from other countries, particularly Japan and the United Kingdom (UK). Now, however, it is essentially alone, especially among member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). During the spring and summer of 1990, both the UK and Japan distanced themselves from the U.S. position. Both countries have announced targets for stabilizing greenhouse gases, joining many other OECD countries that have endorsed stabilization or, in some cases, reduction targets (see table, p. 3). This second group of countries, which advocates a more activist position, is made up mostly of OECD member countries, with Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands taking leading roles. The United Kingdom, despite its more cautious policy statements, has also assumed a position of leadership.

The positions of the other OECD countries share several common features. These countries generally support the view that the scientific evidence points to a significant threat from climate change. Moreover, they feel that the benefits of averting the threat outweigh the costs of limiting emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Some countries (for example, Germany and The Netherlands) are confident that plans to reduce CO2 emissions can be applied without significant impacts on their economies, although Germany admits it has not conducted a thorough analysis. By themselves, however, any unilateral and even joint actions taken by these OECD countries would have little effect on atmospheric CO2 content and could involve large costs for some OECD countries. Many countries state that their proposed efforts are intended to urge other countries to announce similar steps and support multilateral treaty efforts.

If the stabilization and reduction plans serve a primarily political function, their implementation may be compromised by other objectives. For example, Sweden revised a 1986 CO2 stabilization target when it conflicted with plans to phase out nuclear power and limit future hydroelectric projects. The success of Japan's effort to stabilize greenhouse gases may depend on its ability to increase nuclear power capacity, a proposal strongly opposed by the Japanese people. In many OECD countries, CO2 mitigation plans have only received cabinet-level approval and are "provisional"; there are no guarantees that they will be implemented. In addition, some plans are not as robust as they appear. For example, Germany's 25 percent emissions reduction figure is simply derived from an extrapolation of the declining trend in CO2 emissions from 1970 to 1989.

However, even if reducing emissions is costly, many countries may perceive the cost of inaction to be greater. An obvious risk to The Netherlands is flooding from a rise in sea level. Germany, Australia, and Italy may also face acute risks from flooding, and some mountainous countries perceive threats from melting glaciers.

Some countries may even perceive benefits from widespread actions that make alternatives to fossil fuels more economical. For example, France, Sweden, and Germany have invested heavily in nuclear energy, hydroelectric power, and other alternative energy technologies and may foresee benefits from expanded markets for these technologies. Similarly, Japan's recent announcement of reduction targets for greenhouse gases may indicate its recognition of possible benefits from an international treaty, such as financial opportunities arising from the development of environmentally sound technologies.

The radical political and economic changes recently occurring in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union offer hope, but also some concern, about the ability of these countries to address the global warming problem. The move toward democracy and market economies—at least in eastern Europe—has focused much attention on the failure of communist economic and political institutions to protect the environment. In addition, newly acquired political freedom in eastern Europe has made these countries eager to participate in international politics and to become more fully involved in European affairs. Yet given the enormous task of reforming their political and economic systems and of addressing their own environmental problems, eastern European countries and the Soviet Union may find complying with provisions of an international CO2 agreement to be extremely difficult.

Thus these countries have not responded to the CO2 issue with the same degree of commitment characteristic of many western European countries. For example, eastern European countries and the Soviet Union have not shown the same willingness as many western European countries to endorse unilateral action to stabilize or reduce CO2 emissions. Confronted with the need to rebuild shattered economies, following through on commitments to reduce CO2 emissions could be difficult for these countries. Nevertheless, even if unable to make commitments to reduce CO2 emissions, these countries have professed serious concern about the global warming issue. In addition, eastern European countries and the Soviet Union have been well represented at recent international meetings and in the IPCC process; they also have strong scientific communities that are involved in climate change research.

The support of the developing countries will be essential to the long-term success of any international effort to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. These countries currently account for about 29 percent of global CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. If the effects of deforestation are included—and estimates of these vary considerably—the developing countries may account for as much as 45 percent of total global carbon emissions. Equally important is the fact that the rate of increase in carbon emissions in the developing countries is much greater than that in the developed countries. Because of their rapid rate of population growth and industrialization, the developing countries will provide the bulk of new carbon emissions in the coming decades.

Gaining the full participation and support of developing countries for an international agreement on global CO2 emissions will be an enormous task. As is the case in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it is impossible to separate the need for reducing CO2 emissions in developing countries from other issues of economic, political, and social development, such as poverty, environmental degradation, and national debt. Perhaps more important, there is much distrust on the part of developing countries toward the developed countries. Many developing countries believe that their contribution to the global warming problem is being overstated, and they are suspicious of the international attention focused on deforestation and environmental degradation in the developing world. Developing countries feel that the developed countries created the problem and should therefore assume the burden of mitigating it.

In addition, many developing countries fear that they are in a no-win situation. They have neither the capacity nor the flexibility to mitigate CO2 emissions or to easily adapt to changing climate conditions; thus, because of their less developed economies and limited capacity to respond to crises, they are likely to be among the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Developing countries are also concerned that measures to control global CO2 emissions will have a negative impact on their efforts to develop; these countries will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to sacrifice economic development for curbing global CO2 emissions. In order for an international agreement on global warming to gain the widespread support of developing countries, it must address wider issues of environment and development.

Despite the feeling of purpose and commitment that many in the international community share for the global warming issue, attitudes, positions, and interests vary greatly. The success of ongoing international efforts to negotiate an international agreement on controlling global greenhouse gas emissions is by no means assured, yet neither is it impossible. Success, however, will depend on how the different stakes of nations can be dealt with in the negotiation process in an equitable and fair manner.