Even the intended results of new technology are hard to predict; to forecast the direct side effects and the second- and third-round consequences of a new device or method is even harder. A full assessment is obviously impossible, but more and more people have come to believe that much can and should be done toward anticipating things better. A beginning was made in the closing days of the 92nd Congress when an Office of Technology Assessment was voted into existence.
The new legislation follows in many respects recommendations made in 1969 by the panel on technology assessment of the National Academy of Sciences. The idea of such an office had first surfaced in 1967 in a bill introduced in the House by then Congressman Daddario. Technology assessment as such has a much longer history. It is routinely carried out under a variety of labels, in both industry and government, in the pursuit of private and public objectives. The often-heard charge that "technology is running wild" fails to consider that uncounted possibilities for innovation are never translated into production or application precisely because the side effects are considered intolerable. Even, and perhaps especially, the much-criticized pharmaceuticals industry casts out large numbers of substances for every one it adopts. That no one keeps count does not mean that "anything goes."
The more recent idea of technology assessment as a responsibility of society, and thus of government, arises rather from the potential that modern science and technology ford for calamities on a very large scale, and because prior screening for undesirable consequences is often too costly for anyone but government. Just as important is the thought that desirable technologies may not come to the fore because economic incentives might be lagging or because it is difficult for any single producer to reap for long the benefits of his inventiveness. Thus technology assessment should not be thought of merely as a brake; it also can be a throttle.
The rationale of the new act is quickly summarized. Technological applications, it asserts, are "large and growing in scale and increasingly extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and adverse, on the natural and social environment." For this reason the consequences have been "anticipated, understood, and considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems." Federal agencies are not now capable of providing Congress with the appropriate information, nor is Congress itself so equipped. Hence the need for a new mechanism, applicable especially in cases of federal government support for technological applications or for management or regulation thereof.
It is difficult to judge whether the newly created office is the best possible mechanism for accomplishing the task. The office is placed within the legislative branch of the government and will be responsible only to it. It is in fact a joint committee of the Congress, consisting of a board and a director, and assisted by an advisory council. Composed of 6 senators and 6 members of the House—half from each party—plus the director, the 13-man board will be supported by a staff to do the substantive work. Its function will be wholly analytical. The office will evaluate a given project in terms of impacts, cause-and-effect relationships, technological alternatives, identification of needed research or data and associated activities. It will not, according to the language of the act, make recommendations. One imagines, however, that these would be implicit in the findings. Initiative for undertaking studies will lie within the Congress, relayed to the office through congressional committees, though anybody but a committee's chairman or ranking minority member must persuade a majority of his committee to join him before a request can be passed on to the Office of Technology Assessment.
Since the Advisory Council may recommend (though not direct) that the board initiate assessments, its composition is of interest. Of the the 12 members, the act specifies only Comptroller General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service Service of the Library of Congress. The remaining 10 are to appointed by the board from persons in public life. These are characterized as "persons eminent in or more fields of the physical, biological, or social sciences or engineering, or experienced in the administration of technological activities, or who may be judged qualified on the basis of contributions made to educational or public activities." Obviously, this leaves a large field of choice. However, the activity is not envisaged as exclusively or perhaps even predominantly carried out by or pertinent scientists. In defining the impact of technology the act specifically enumerates political, social, and economic effects.
Because the scope is vast, the board is authorized to make use of outside talent. It may form task forces, employ outside organizations and institutions, and specifically have resort to the facilities of the Library of Congress and the National Science Foundation (NSF). With all these alternatives formally established in the act, one may hope that the new office will not be able, even if it so desired, to live in isolation from the public. Moreover, with only $5 million authorized (and not yet appropriated) for its first two years of life, it will have to count heavily on funds from other agencies, especially NSF, if it hopes to make a respectable showing.
As it finally emerged from the Congress, the act followed only one-half of the organizational recommendation of the National Academy panel mentioned earlier. That panel had suggested a double-barreled structure in which the Congress would equip itself with a unit not essentially different from what it will now have, paralleled by a twin in the executive branch, specifically in the Office of Science and Technology. A reading of the National Academy panel report discloses that the idea had been to bring technology assessment close to the seat of executive power and thus provide for initiative in both branches of government. Perhaps the failure to establish an executive mechanism reflects the growing desire of Congress to reassert its power. However, another panel suggestion—that the new office should begin life by limiting its activity to government-funded or -sponsored projects, rather than spread itself over the entire economy—has been followed, as has the inclusion of positive goals for technology.
Apart from the difficulties of starting any new function, the new office faces some specific problems. A provision that all of its findings be made public was deleted as the bill moved toward passage. Perhaps the office will release its reports in any case; indeed, an open policy will be essential to enlisting support of the professional community. Another problem may be difficulty of access to the office; here the Advisory Council could be very useful. Finally, there is a danger that people may expect too much from technology assessment.
There is no way of by-passing political choices. Technology assessment can only illuminate, not replace, them. It can, however, be immensely helpful in building up a fund of experience as to what are the "right questions," and to pioneer in a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive approach. It can also be useful in stimulating similar activities throughout the executive branch, not in adversary proceedings, but by example. The caliber of both board and staff will determine the success of this new venture. So will the inclinations of the Advisory Council and a public attitude prepared to concede a generous grace period during which time scales, urgencies, and other priority criteria can be determined. Having received astonishingly little publicity outside the technical press, technology assessment could well turn out to have been to the 92nd Congress what the Environmental Impact Statement was to the 91st— the sleeper of the year.
A version of this article appeared in print in the January 1973 issue of Resources magazine.
