The classic mineral policy issues of the United States stem from two interrelated questions: Why are we not doing more to foster our domestic mineral industries, and how can we reduce our dependence on foreign sources of certain key mineral commodities?
The first concern was the impetus for passage of the Mineral Policy Act of 1970, while since 1973, OPEC activities, sanctions against Rhodesian chromite bauxite producer alliances, and the like have triggered commissions, hearings, and investigations into our reliance on foreign minerals. The current federal Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review seems to have been precipitated by the first concern but may end up focused mainly on the second.
In 1977, at a time of high unemployment in mining and depressed mineral prices, particular in copper, Rep. Jim Santini (D-NV) and others urged President Carter to give attention to the domestic minerals industry. Late that year, the president responded by directing his assistant for domestic affairs and policy, Stuart E. Eizenstat, to initiate an interagency review of all aspects of nonfuel minerals policy.
The lead officer for the review is Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, who was named chairman of the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). It was understood, however, that cabinet departments other than the Interior would take the lead on some of the subaspects of minerals policy (for example, the State Department of international aspects) and that the Office of Science and Technology Poll in the Executive Office of the President would also have an active role in the overall proceedings.
By June 1978, the PCC had decided on a problem-analysis phase followed by a policy-analysis phase. The first phase will culminate in an interim problem report, probably in February 1979. This report will be the basis of public hearings planned as part of the second phase. Following the policy analysis, the PCC will send a response memorandum to the Office of Domestic Affairs and Policy (headed by Eizenstat), which will then prepare a decision memorandum for the president’s consideration.
The interagency Minerals Review Committee, chaired by Dr. John Morgan, the then–acting director of the US Bureau of Mines (Department of the Interior), has played a key role in the problem analysis and has identified twelve specific minerals which, on the basis of such criteria as dollar value, import dependence, and substitutability, might merit particular attention. The Minerals Review Committee also investigated major mineral supply problems, the broadest of nine areas selected for study. The other eight areas are availability of foreign minerals to the United States and its allies; relationship of environmental quality, health and safety, and price and availability of minerals; mineral resource potential of federal lands; financing, capital formation, and tax policies; competitiveness of the US minerals industry; conservation, substitution, and recycling; adequacy of minerals-related research and development; and adequacy of existing government capabilities to support federal policymaking.
Common themes approved by the PCC for all nine areas were as follows:
What nonfuel minerals problems either exist now or could occur within the next 25 years which could require presidential or cabinet attention?
What are the objectives of current federal policies and programs? To what extent, if any, are problems aggravated by current federal policies or programs?
What would be the likely impacts of these problems on gross national product, inflation, employment, the minerals industry, the environment, or foreign policy?
The policy-analysis phase will consider detailed issues and options specified by the PCC on the basis of its review of the interim problem report. The anticipated general themes are:
Are current government policies and programs adequate to address the problems selected from phase I or their most serious impacts? What are the expected benefits and costs of these policies and programs?
If current policies and programs are not adequate, what alternatives could be implemented either to avert or alleviate these problems or their most serious impacts? What are the expected benefits and costs of these alternatives?
How do the expected benefits and costs of the alternative policies and programs compare with those of current policies and programs? (Where possible, comparisons should be both quantitative and qualitative.)
What decision options should be presented to the PCC and the president, and what recommendations should be made on each of these options?
The problems identified in the policy review will deal both with the vulnerability of the United States to interruption or price escalation in imported supplies and with the health of the minerals industry. Since the remedies for both problems involve either import limitations or governmental assistance, it will be interesting to see how the ultimate proposals fit in with a presumed overriding need to stem inflation and hold down federal spending. Because of the particular US dependence on critical minerals from Africa, it will also be intriguing to note how much decisional weight (assuming it can be publicly ascertained) is given to mineral supply considerations in connection with future US diplomatic dealings with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zaire; with the UN as a potent factor in the African political situation; and with the USSR as a significant alternative supplier. Another thought-provoking question is to what extent the hope of mineral supplies figures in the expectations arising from our new relations with the People’s Republic of China.
A version of this article appeared in print in the January 1979 issue of Resources magazine.
