Entering the Twenty-First Century—the Global 2000 Report to the President

According to its authors, "the Global 2000 Study is the first U.S. Government effort to look at all three issues (population, resources, and the environment) from a long-term global perspective that recognizes their interrelationships and attempts to make connections among them."

By any standard, this was an ambitious undertaking and no one should have been surprised that the report falls short of the mark. What is surprising, however—given the resources devoted to the report and the widespread publicity it achieved—is Global 2000's many internal inconsistencies and the selective emphasis accorded some of its conclusions. It is instructive to examine both the process and the result.

In May 1977, President Carter directed the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Department of State "to make a one-year study of the probable changes in the world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century." It is no criticism of the study team to note that the task proved to be too much for the timetable: the one-year study required more than three years for completion. It was transmitted to the president in two volumes and released to the general public in July 1980. Volume 1 is a forty-eight-page summary report and volume 2 a much longer (766 pages) Technical Report. Although it has not been published, a third volume—The Government's Global Model—has been written.

The organizers of the study note that "it was decided early that the Global 2000 Study should exercise and employ the 'present foundation' to the fullest extent possible. As a result, the Study has been conducted almost exclusively with Government personnel and Government projection tools." Indeed, little use was made of personnel or materials from outside government in making the report's projections. The environmental analysis part of the study, however, does draw on many consultants and materials from nongovernmental sources, and included in volume 2 is a long list of "informal advisors" to the study.

It is pointed out that "this study projects foreseeable trends under the assumption that present policies and policy trends continue without major change" (emphasis in the original). The authors in some instances consider the possibility of modifying present policies, but on the whole—and regrettably so—the report is faithful to this basic assumption. Whereas assuming a continuation of present policies is not uncommon in projections of the future, it is always unrealistic: if present policies produce undesired results, they will surely be changed, even if the form and the direction of the change presently are unclear. A rigid application of this assumption might well produce quite misleading apparent results.

In an approach which is common among all of us who study possible futures, the report states, "It must be stressed that the results of this study are projections, not forecasts." But, as always, this approach has limitations. If the projections are made from assumptions that have been chosen because they seem reasonable, the result may not be much different from a forecast based on what analysts thought would most probably happen. The projection/forecast distinction thus becomes mostly semantic.

At least implicitly, the Global 2000 writers did not fully observe their own guideline on this point. In many places the wording and tone would lead the average reader to conclude that the changes discussed were forecasts. Indeed, a number of the projections actually use the word "forecast," and the fairly long (and inconclusive) chapter on climate, which seeks to ascertain what climatologists think is the most probable scenario of climatic change up to the year 2000, clearly is more forecast than projection. I do not regard deviation from a strict line on this matter as significant for, regardless of how one defines the terms, many—and perhaps most—readers will interpret the discussion as forecasts of expected changes or developments.

According to the report, "The process chosen for the Global 2000 Study was to develop trend projections using, to the fullest extent possible, the long-term global data and models routinely employed by the Federal agencies." Volumes 1 and 2, in fact, present relatively little data on past trends.

As might well be imagined for a study having the ambitious scope of Global 2000, the data problems were very serious indeed. Even for the industrially developed countries, desired data may be suspect or missing altogether. For countries with centrally planned economies, the doubt increases greatly; and for much of the economically less developed world, the data may be wholly lacking or not much more than conjectural, even for such major matters as population, and vastly more for such matters as the use of wood for fuel. When possible, Global 2000 includes analyses by major countries, by groups of countries, or by major regions (continents) of the world, but in some cases nothing more than a single global figure is available. As the report warns, in many places the figures cannot be taken as more than general approximations.

Chapters 1 through 12 of Volume 2 present, in about 220 pages, quantitative projections for specific commodities or groups of commodities or for factors expected to affect such projections—population, the GNP, climate, technology, food and agriculture, fisheries, forestry, water, energy, fuel minerals, and nonfuel minerals. While the analysis naturally depends partly on the subject, in general the past is explored, the present situation is examined, and projections (or forecasts) of the future are made. The degree of geographic detail varies greatly, ranging from country-by-country analyses for population to essentially no geographic breakdown for technology. It is stated that "the projections reported in this study are based on the collective judgment of the agency experts who participated in the effort."

First drafts of projections were from a considerable number of federal agencies produced in six week's time, after which a small group of outside experts —mostly persons generally identified with the environmental movement—met for a "weekend synthesis meeting" with those responsible for the projections. Not unexpectedly, inconsistencies were revealed, and the agencies were asked to provide revised final projections in the ensuing two months. However, the report reveals, "To ensure internal consistency, several adjustments were required in individual agency projections. As a result, the projections may not agree completely with projections previously published by the participating agencies." Unfortunately, no information is presented about the direction or degree of these adjustments, nor about the degree to which the originating agencies concurred in the adjustments.

Chapter 13 of Volume 2 (nearly as long as the twelve chapters which precede it) deals with the environmental consequences of the projections and also is based on the work of outside experts. Data deficiencies are repeatedly noted, but the authors conclude (and I agree) that it is better to make the best possible analysis on the basis of poor information than to try to avoid a difficult subject altogether. In the words of the report, chapter 13 is "largely discursive, rather than analytical."

In general, the authors of different sections write as concerned environmentalists and point to the serious environmental effects of various projections. This, of course, was their assignment. In my view they put a bit too much stress on the dark side and give not enough credit to the brighter aspects of resource use and to the possibilities for ecologically or economically sound corrective actions. But that is a matter of opinion.

The environmental criticisms of the projections build to a climax in the last forty pages of chapter 13, under a major heading, "Closing the Loops." Whereas the report up to this point has emphasized the environmental impacts of the projections, now the direction of the analysis is reversed and the authors explore the effect of environmental considerations on the realism of the projections. This is a commendable undertaking for it reveals inconsistencies among the projections. But it is virtually a total repudiation of the projections made by the agencies and as modified by the Global 2000 staff. Time and time again, the earlier projections are characterized as inadequate, incomplete, inconsistent, or inaccurate. Originally, the federal agencies' assistance had been sought because of their expertise, but here the study staff substitutes its judgments for those of the agencies.

Why was such a curious and circuitous process followed? Once the projections were considered unreliable, why were they then published, only to be refuted? One is left to guess at the reasons, but whatever they may be, their effect is confusing at best. At worst, the abrupt turnabout raises questions about the credibility of the entire project.

Space does not permit even a summary review of all the report's projections, but a few may be singled out as examples.

The Global 2000 group sought and obtained high, medium, and low population projections from the Bureau of the Census. Only the medium projections, given in more detail, are used later in the report. Starting with the best available data on present population numbers (though admittedly they are somewhat dubious for some countries), and using estimates of future fertility and mortality, projections were made for five-year intervals up to 2000 for major countries, for continents, and for the world as a whole. As seen by the demographers, the estimate of future fertility trends was judgmental: "No mathematical model of fertility change was used." The high series results in a world population of 6.8 billion by 2000; the medium series, 6.4 billion; and the low series, 5.9 billion, as compared with a population of 4.1 billion in 1975.

At the urging of the Agency for International Development, the Community and Family Study Center of the University of Chicago also was asked to prepare population projections. This marks the only major use of an outside agency for specific projections. The Center used essentially the same methodology as that used by the Bureau of the Census. The assumptions as to future fertility trends are set forth by groups of countries, rather more sharply and clearly than in the census projection:, and are based largely on assumptions about the rate of adoption of family-planning techniques.

Though the report is not explicit, one may reasonably assume that the Chicago group felt it was extrapolating past trends into the future. There is no better example of the ambiguities of the trend projection process than is provided by these differing population projections. The Center's medium series projection for world population in 2000 was 5.88 billion persons, or about 8 percent below the Census Bureau projection for the same series and same data. On the basis of the increase above the 1980 figure, the Chicago estimate is 17 percent lower than the Census Bureau estimate. Moreover, at future dates, beyond 2000, the Chicago growth rate would drop far more sharply than would the Census Bureau rate.

The two estimates agree that the rate of population increase will be very low in the economically developed countries and relatively high in the economically less developed countries. Based on experience of the past forty years or more, one can have only slight confidence in any of these figures. They do demonstrate, however, that the best demographers have substantially different judgments about future populations, even if they start with the same numbers and use the same general analytical procedures.

The food and agricultural projections have three scenarios: baseline, optimistic, and lower bound, with a range of figures for each. Under the lower-bound estimate, world food supply per capita is expected to rise by 3 percent by 1985 and by 4 percent by 2000: For the optimistic scenario, it would rise by 14 and 26 percent, respectively, for 1980 and 2000; and on the baseline projection it would rise by about 14 percent for both years.

The fact that no decline is projected in per-capita food supply, even under the lower-bound estimate or in the face of the projected great increase in population, is at once significant and heartening. More negatively, serious problems of soil erosion, overgrazing, soil salination and waterlogging, and other undesirable environmental consequences are described for each scenario—generally these problems are worse in the poorer and in the tropical countries but not absent anywhere.

The report emphasizes projected deforestation, especially of the humid tropics. By 2000, the total forested area of the world is projected to decrease by 17 percent and that of the economically less developed countries by 40 percent. This deforestation is estimated to increase soil erosion on mountainsides; to increase silt content of streams, with resulting adverse effects on fisheries and coastal areas; to result in more erratic and less valuable streamflows; and, perhaps, to produce adverse climatic effects. The situation is estimated to be worst in arid areas, where people rely on scarce wood supplies for fuel, and in tropical forests, where the expected deforestation will lead to the extinction of hundreds of thousands of plant, insect, and animal species.

The forestry picture is one of the gloomiest of the whole report. The assumption is that "the present net global deforestation rate of 18-20 million hectares per year will continue through the end of the century." But then, in a footnote, the authors agree that the various estimates of present deforestation differ widely. They cite an optimistic projection by two authors from the Food and Agriculture Organization, who state that the rate of deforestation will decrease to 4 million hectares annually by 2000. The governments of the tropical countries estimate an annual deforestation rate of 6.4 million hectares in the 1975-80 period; and yet another analysis finds that "a more widely used estimate of tropical deforestation is 10-12 million hectares per year."

It is not clear why the Global 2000 group felt that their estimate—18 to 40 million hectares deforested annually—was more reasonable than any of the others.

Since these data relate to slightly different time periods and sometimes to slightly different areas, precise comparability among these various figures may be impossible. Nevertheless, there is a serious lack of reliable information in this section (and most other sections are better in this respect only by degree). Moreover, scant allowance is made for natural or man-made reforestation or for the development of protective plant cover other than trees.

If Volume 2 suggests a rather gloomy picture of the future, Volume 1—the executive summary—is explicit: "The world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. . . . Despite greater material output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways." And interpretations by others are gloomier still. For example, Rep. Henry Reuss, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, said, "The Global 2000 report documents a world a bare twenty years from now that is desolate and dying, the result of the past, present, and prospective follies of its people." Similarly, accounts in the news media have focused primarily on the grimmer aspects of the report.

The study itself not only projects a better food supply per capita in 2000, but also, and what is more important, a substantially lengthened life expectancy, especially in the lower-income countries. In such countries, life expectancy is estimated to increase by 18 percent over the present, compared with an increase of only 3 percent in the economically developed countries; and half of the gap in life expectancy between rich and poor countries is projected to close by 2000. How can one reconcile this basic measure of well-being with dire statements about the future?

As the report points out in some detail, the situation will differ greatly among countries and by income classes within each country. In terms of income, some will be very much better off; some will be somewhat better off; and many no better off in absolute terms and hence worse off relative to the rest of the population.

President Carter, in setting up the Global 2000 inquiry, requested an appraisal of trends, but he did not ask for policy recommendations. The report contains no explicit policy conclusions or recommendations, although its presentations implicitly suggest many policy conclusions.

Not that the report will fade away from a lack of policy recommendations. In October Representative Reuss's subcommittee issued a report, Averting Catastrophe: The Global Challenge, which calls for action to rescue the world from the future portrayed in Global 2000.

In November a Global 2000 Citizens Committee was formed with both publicity and policy goals, and many environmental organizations individually have taken full notice of the report.

In January, only days before leaving office, President Carter was presented Global Future: Time to Act, a bundle of recommendations prepared at his direction by the Global 2000 team.

There is no need here to discuss the various recommendations or how well grounded they are in fact. What is of more interest is whether any of them stand a good chance of implementation by a Reagan administration which owes nothing to environmentalists and which is perceived at this early date as being hostile to many goals of the environmental movement. On the other hand, President Reagan has called himself an environmentalist. Perhaps the seeds of Global 2000 will fall on not entirely barren ground.

Ironically, had Global 2000 been completed by the end of its original one-year schedule, whatever policies flowed from it would have been institutionalized now for two years. It might have been difficult to dislodge them regardless of their popularity with a new administration.

Global 2000 is seriously flawed. Its processes are suspect, its data lacking, its inconsistencies too prevalent, and many of its conclusions unwarranted. Yet as a first cut at an enormous—probably impossible—task, it is not egregiously bad, and it does identify some real problems which do need to be imprinted on the public consciousness.

Warts and all, Global 2000 clearly has become part of the professional literature. Moreover, it is an official US. Government document, and it may become an obligatory citation for future research and policymaking. Only time will tell whether it will serve as even a partial guide during the next twenty years or whether it will be viewed as only a footnote to the Carter years.