SAFE DRINKING WATER became a political issue, as opposed to an environmental cause, in February 1978, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its proposed regulations for the control of organic contamination of public water supplies—regulations required under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. Because contamination is widespread, and because reducing it to very low levels is expensive—at least in comparison with the treatment processes commonly used in municipal water systems—these regulations promise to have significant bite.
Just how significant was revealed at the series of seven hearings held by the EPA around the country to gather public comment on the regulations. The EPA heard principally the intense opposition of the water suppliers. Their arguments ran the gamut from attacking the scientific basis for action to denying that the proposed treatment technology (activated carbon filtration) is capable of doing the job. Meanwhile, a group of about ninety utilities calling itself the Coalition for Safe Drinking Water set out to fight the regulations through counter studies of health effects, costs, and energy use implications, as well as through legal action.
Scientists, economists, and lobbyists. At about the same time the National Academy of Sciences issued a follow-up to its 1977 drinking water study, this one concentrating on a review of the epidemiological evidence for a link between the organic content of drinking water and human cancer. Depending on one's point of view, this report can be read either as a discouraging dismissal of available epidemiological evidence or as an unwarranted call for caution and further research. If nothing else, the report will put another nail in the coffin of the idea that science will tell us what correct public policy should be.
Weighing in on the side of economic caution has been the Council on Wage and Price Stability, in particular its director, Barry Bosworth. While not presuming to say that nothing should be done, Bosworth has argued that the EPA's proposed approach is inefficient even on its own terms, because it does not take full advantage of the economies of scale in treatment by concentrating on the very largest cities. (The EPA proposed that its regulations apply to systems with more than 75,000 customers; Bosworth claims 100,000 makes more sense.)
Keeping up the fight for strict standards is the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the leading public interest group on the drinking water issue. Through testimony at the EPA hearings, submission of written comments on the proposed regulations, and efforts to continue publicizing the issues, the EDF has endeavored to counter the opposition of the utilities.
Congressional options. Despite some "fine tuning" in response to a year of hearings and lobbying, it seems unlikely that the EPA's final regulations will be greatly relaxed from the original proposals of February 1978. The administration of the EPA is publicly committed to a strong stance against toxic substances and to emphasizing preventive action on environmental public health questions generally.
The EPA's actions will not, of course, be the end of it. Though time may dull the pain of wounded professional pride, which seems to account for much of the water professions' opposition, Congress will not wait to act. Early in the 1979 session, Congress will begin hearings on authorizations for the EPA's effort in administering the Safe Drinking Water Act. These hearings provide an oversight opportunity and an occasion to debate important changes in the law. (There were very brief hearings in the House and Senate in the summer of 1978, which seem best characterized as opportunities for the utilities to let off steam.) Uncertainty about the direction of the hearings is especially great because of the retirement of Rep. Paul Rogers (D—Florida), the chairman of the relevant subcommittee, Health and the Environment, of the House Commerce Committee. Rogers, referred to as the father of the Safe Drinking Water Act, was known for his strong stands on the proenvironmentalist side of this and other issues.
The least that Congress will attempt is some relaxation of the regulations that will lower the cost or lengthen the time-tables for compliance, or both. At the other extreme, it is possible that there will be an attempt to change the entire philosophical base of the act by altering the requirement for action. The EPA can now act when the administrator believes that a contaminant may have an adverse effect on the health of persons. The alternative philosophy would permit action only when there is knowledge that a contaminant will have such an effect. Because of unresolved scientific disputes over the results and interpretation of tests of suspected carcinogens on animals, and because of the ambiguity of epidemiological evidence, it could be very hard indeed to regulate organic chemicals in water supplies under the tougher test. Thus, if such an attempt at amendment is made, it will signal a very fundamental battle over the basis for toxic chemical regulations generally.