The Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act of 1977 (RCA) authorized a major appraisal of the nation's soil and water conservation problems and policies. Given the expectations that the project excited, to many participants the final outcome as expressed in the program document and recommendations to Congress must have seemed an anticlimax.
Dust storms and gullies
Federal soil and water conservation programs had their origin half a century ago in the dust storms of the Plains and the gullies of the Eastern Piedmont. At a time when nature and economics added to the tribulations of an already distressed farm population, the evangelical message of conservationists took root both in the countryside and the federal bureaucracy. Grassed waterways, check dams, conservation districts, and idle acres spread quickly, all aided by Uncle Sam's money and ubiquitous conservation officials.
From the beginning, conservation programs had an incestuous relationship with farm price- and income-support programs and their effectiveness in controlling erosion probably was diluted in consequence. Despite immense changes in the farm economy over ensuing decades—changes that literally have altered the rationale for these programs—they were not subjected to searching review of their need or effectiveness. The RCA process, undertaken at congressional initiative, was meant to remedy this neglect.
After collecting an immense amount of information, assessing the major problems, and analyzing alternative policies, the final RCA program report, reflecting the views of a new administration, drew back from the more daring policies that were considered along the way. In particular, it shunned novel economic incentive programs to induce farmers to employ conservation practices and came down in favor of traditional technical assistance and subsidy measures. Although the report did support the extension of conservation tillage, the major innovation proposed was a shift in institutional arrangements toward giving states a greater role.
Coming late in the year, the recommended changes were only partially noted by Congress in passing the 1981 farm bill. Neither the final report nor the farm legislation pays special heed to the evolution of the farm economy, nor do they respond fully to the concern for conservation expressed in the RCA background studies. The result is a course that may not be much more effective than existing programs. Indeed, the program seems to reflect caution on the part of influential constituencies at a time when prospects seem bleak for new federal money to ease the way to new programs.
Erosion and flood damage
The RCA study covered a range of issues, from wildlife habitat to water supply and quality and rural waste management problems, with soil erosion and upstream flood damage receiving priority attention in the program report. The heart of the analysis was an attempt to model the erosion problem for expected future dates (out to 2030) using an elaborate model developed at Iowa State University. From this exercise future erosion losses were calculated under a variety of assumptions, and an attempt was made to translate these losses into equivalent acres of farmland.
A commonly used standard for judging the severity of erosion is the so-called T value or tolerance level—a rate of soil loss that can be tolerated continuously without impairing the long-term agricultural productivity of the land. This value permits a maximum annual soil loss of 5 tons per acre on cropland, as it happens, just above the national average soil loss on cropland. But averages are notoriously misleading. While on more than three-fourths of the nation's cropland the erosion rate by water does not exceed 5 tons, the average masks much higher losses on some lands, including highly productive acreage in the Cornbelt subject to water erosion and many acres on the Plains that are vulnerable to wind erosion. More than half of all cropland erosion by water, and 90 percent of all that over the 5-ton level, occurs on a mere 10 percent of the land. There is no "average erosion." Rather, excessive erosion is a local phenomenon, the product of particular circumstances.
Targeting erosion control
This suggests that programs to deal with erosion should be focused with equal sharpness. Past programs have been criticized for their "first come, first served" approach to the problem, an outgrowth of the government's emphasis on voluntary participation by farmers and the propensity of federal agencies to provide "delivery systems" throughout the land. What is needed is a better targeting of erosion control policies and practices, so that they are focused on the lands where the problem is most severe.
In presenting this program to Congress, Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block stressed the need for better targeting—a clear advance if it can be accomplished. However, the criteria for establishing priority areas to receive attention are vague. Presumably the amount of gross erosion in excess of the T value will be a major consideration, but this does not necessarily correlate closely with loss of productivity or with the off-site economic damage done by erosion. Finally, it must be noted that the politics of soil conservation always favor the broadest geographic dispersion of effort.
New Federalism farming
Placing more responsibility on the states is a major policy theme of the Reagan administration, and it is reflected in this report. Soil conservation programs always have stressed voluntary compliance and strong local involvement, and states undoubtedly will continue to make use of federal agencies' technical expertise in carrying out their programs. In the absence of major new funding, however, it is unclear how effective the changes will be In controlling erosion. By giving states responsibility, the aspiration to target programs more carefully on a national basis is sure to be weakened. On the other hand, within their own jurisdictions states may be tougher in assigning priorities for action. Also, some states faced with grave problems may be more willing than federal agencies to enforce mandatory rules, and they may well be more innovative in exploring new and more cost-effective means of achieving program objectives.
The RCA report is not very rewarding in other important respects. The need for action is based on assumptions about demand, technology, soil loss, and productivity that can be challenged at each step. But even if the assumptions are granted, adjustments need not be confined to soil conservation policies. The nation could, for example, reduce erosive use of the land by limiting grain exports, or by increasing research on new technologies, or in other ways. And there is little discussion of the concept of society's responsibility for what is legally a private resource. What is society's stake in reducing erosion on private land, and how should it relate to the private costs and benefits implied by various methods of attaining a particular level of control? Finally, if there is a social interest in reducing erosion (presumably a long-term interest), why are the states more logical custodians of that interest than is the federal government?
A still-open question
This will not be the final chapter in the RCA process; congressional oversight will extend to another round. On federal lands, management agencies have been required by legislation over the past two decades to provide a more coherent system of planning and accounting for their programs. A Congress accustomed to this standard for public lands programs is sure to ask similar coherence in objectives and cost-effectiveness for programs on private lands. The RCA study, by its very caution on recommendations, inevitably opens these matters for discussion in future years. In a leaner fiscal world, conservation programs will have to face basic questions of purpose, scope, and equity that they still avoid today.
Author Sterling Brubaker is senior fellow and associate director of RFs Renewable Resources Division.