While no electrically propelled vehicles emerged on the streets in 1967, the search for an alternative or supplement to the gasoline-driven car was intensified, with government taking a hand at least in sorting out the problems and possibilities.
Early in the year, the Federal Power Commission, at the request of Senator Magnuson, prepared a report entitled Development of Electrically Powered Vehicles, in which it assessed the state of the arts as well as the likely market for such vehicles. In March and April two Senate committees joined forces to hold hearings to discuss the internal combustion engine and its competitors in the context of two bills aimed at federal funding of research, development, and demonstration of vehicles that do not pollute the air. The government's attitude, as expressed by a long list of cabinet officers and others, was that private industry had by no means exhausted its own efforts in that field and that it would be premature to inject the government in ways other than the setting of air quality standards.
At the same time, a report was being prepared by a Panel on Electrically Powered Vehicles, which had been appointed by the Secretary of Commerce acting in conjunction with a number of interested federal agencies.
The panel's mission was to consider the government's appropriate role in the area of subsidizing research and development on pollution-free transportation systems, and specifically the appropriate administration response to the above-mentioned pending bills in the Congress. The panel's summary report, published under the title, The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Program for Progress, was released in October 1967. It contains 16 recommendations, including the usual calls for research, review, coordination, plans, programs, and standard setting at national, regional, and local levels.
The panel recommended specific controls on tetraethyl lead emissions and on diesel smoke and odor; it called attention to the inappropriateness of setting standards in terms of pollutant concentration at the tailpipe (which make no distinction, for instance, between large and small cars) and recommended limits on the total mass of pollutants emitted during a specific driving cycle. This is an important—and long overdue—step forward. One of the consequences of such an approach would be to raise the cost of emissions control for larger cars, which are the ones that produce a greater mass of pollutants, and this in turn would make it more attractive for purchasers to drive smaller cars, which emit a smaller amount of pollutants. The panel recommended a five year federal research program in the amount of $60 million, to support "innovative development" in the areas of (a) energy sources for vehicles, (b) propulsion systems for vehicles, (c) emission control devices, (d) special purpose urban cars, (e) general purpose vehicles. The panel thus went somewhat beyond the more cautious government statements voiced in spring congressional hearings.
On technological issues, the report was somewhat pessimistic on the future of electric vehicles, which it found wanting in range or power and economic feasibility. One point that may surprise many people is the fact that one of the low-emission alternatives to internal combustion engines mentioned in the report is a piston-type steam engine "of advanced design." This favorable mention was made despite the fact that the report apparently used obsolete data for steam engines in compiling its comparisons of power to-weight capabilities for various types of engines. Available information, not referred to in the summary report, indicates that steam engines would virtually eliminate all unwanted emissions, including lead, while providing superior driving characteristics in many respects (e.g., no gear changing).
The report does not specifically recommend development of the steam engine for auto use, but the phrasing of its brief comments suggests that we shall hear more about this. The report is optimistic about reducing pollution from conventional internal combustion engines, although with many qualifications. "Ultimately"—some time after 1980—unburned hydrocarbon emissions per car per year are expected to be one-fiftieth of what they were in 1963; carbon monoxide, one-fourteenth; and oxides of nitrogen, one ninth—all in new cars. But it points out that judgment whether the "ultimate" levels will be satisfactory must be suspended pending development of many other social and biological factors that could render them noxious at that time.
The report recognizes additionally that "if currently approved devices and their descendants deteriorate significantly [due to aging], progress in pollution control may be only a fraction of that now estimated." And it warns that, in fact, "currently automotive air pollution control devices are vulnerable to progressive degradation and alteration, and periodic inspection and adjustment are essential. The organizations, procedures, and personnel for implementing this phase of a national program are not available." The panel, therefore, calls, for "the creation of effective local inspection mechanisms" and for encouragement of their establishment through the use of federal matching grants. Criteria for effectiveness were not, however, spelled out.
In viewing the respective roles of industry and government, the panel emphasizes the importance of government incentives to promote a more positive industry and consumer of response toward the introduction devices and techniques, and the costs that will flow from this. It singles out the setting of emission standards as an incentive of primary significance, and calls attention to the fact that unless modified by government policy, market forces are not likely to compel industry to produce a vehicle that will satisfy air pollution control standards.
The panel's report is, perhaps, least helpful in its failure to provide much insight into the special urban applications where electrically rechargeable, battery-powered vehicles might be utilized now, and where they might fit given modifications in social and economic institutions. Although conventional mass transportation is recognized as playing a role in reducing automotive air pollution in congested urban centers—and one of the recommendations, therefore, calls for increased federal support for mass transportation research, development, and demonstration programs—there is no explicit recognition of less familiar concepts such as electric "U-drive-it” taxis, dual-mode electric vehicles capable of using roads or rails, "piggybacking" service for commuters, etc. Similarly, the Panel apparently attributes little significance to the growth of automobile rentals, especially in cities. Yet there are obvious economic incentives for fleet operators in the low maintenance cost of electric automobiles which should more than balance their high initial cost—one of the major arguments against battery powered vehicles. Others expect rapid growth in such rental arrangements.
Several of the unconventional alternatives that are considered by the Panel are ruled out as "not economically feasible"; yet nowhere in the report is there any definition the term. If it refers to cost, as it most likely does, at what level above the average cost of the gasoline-driven car does cost become prohibitive? What is the relationship of that higher cost to the benefits of reduced pollution, and what issues would it raise with regard to equity of the distribution of costs and benefits? And if "feasibility" does not refer to cost, what does it apply to: production arrangements, servicing arrangements, refueling arrangements? It would have been most helpful to find some mention of this set of problems in the panel's report. Of course, it is possible that these issues, among others, will be covered in the sub-panel studies (Part II of the Report) which at the end of the year had not been released.
A version of this article appeared in print in the January 1968 issue of Resources magazine.
